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An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. Model
Tax Treaties: History, Provisions and
Application to U.S. Foreign Policy
Donald R. Whittaker*
I. Introduction
This article examines the roles of treaties in the field of international
taxation and the uses which such treaties might have in United States
foreign policy. International tax treaties were developed to avoid the
assertion of taxing jurisdiction by more than one country over the same
person or item of income. Tax treaties attempt to provide a rational
solution to the problems of such double taxation. In addition, tax trea-
ties provide a cogent operating base for two nations dealing with tax
problems: they define the terms that are a part of the operative provi-
sions of the treaty and generally provide a commentary to the text of the
treaty. Most treaties also include statements that assure nondiscrimina-
tory treatment between residents of the signatory jurisdictions. Recent
treaties have also begun to include procedures for consultation between
the taxing authorities of the two countries and procedures for the ex-
change of tax information.
Because of the need for international conformity among tax treaties,
the League of Nations first sponsored several groups of experts who
drafted model treaties.' Those drafters and their model treaties were
later used by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in drafting its influential model treaty in 1963 (OECD
Model).2 The OECD Model, which was revised and amended in 1977,3
has served as a working model for the developed European and North
American countries for the last two decades. In the early 1970's, the
United Nations (U.N.) instituted a similar drafting session to develop a
model tax treaty, but the U.N. goal was to write guidelines adaptable to
* Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City; B.A. 1977, Ursinus College, J.D.
1980, Duke University School of Law.
I See, e.g., Report by the Government Experts on Double Taxation and Evasion of Taxa-
tion Annex 1, League of Nations Doc. F. 50. 1923 11 (1923).
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Draft Double Taxation
Convention on Income and Capital (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 OECD Draft].
3 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1977 OECD Model].
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tax treaties between developed and developing nations (U.N. Guide-
lines).4 Thus, in the tax treaty arena, two sets of guidelines are available
for negotiating tax conventions: the OECD Model and the U.N.
Guidelines.
Part I of this article examines some of the basic operative assump-
tions of tax treaties. In Part II, selected provisions of the OECD Model
and the U.N. Guidelines are examined and compared. This examination
points out the many similarities and some of the crucial differences be-
tween the two drafts, and notes the assumptions that gave rise to each
draft. In addition, the United States model tax treaty developed by the
Department of the Treasury is also examined.
In the final section of this article, the current United States position
on tax expenditures for developing nations is examined. Then, with ref-
erence to the provisions of the model treaties, and with a knowledge of
the policy which shaped these provisions, a form of foreign aid through
tax treaty negotiation is suggested which is both consistent with United
States international tax policy and feasible in the current political
environment.
II. Basic Operative Assumptions of Tax Treaties
Tax treaties are bilateral conventions which are negotiated between
sovereign states for the primary purpose of resolving problems of double
taxation. 5 The problem of double taxation arises from the assertion, by
more than one country, of jurisdiction to tax the same item of income.
Double taxation of the same item of income occurs since most countries
exercise jurisdiction to tax an item of income from two bases-jurisdic-
tion may be asserted because of the source of the income' or because of
the residence of the recipient of the item of income." A third jurisdic-
tional base, exercised in the international arena primarily by the United
States, is assertion of the right to tax because of the citizenship of the
individual. 8 An easy illustration of the principle of double.taxation may
be found in examining the treatment of interest income which is received
on a loan by a lender who is a resident in Canada, a 6itizen of the United
States, and which is earned on a loan to a resident of Guatemala. This
interest might be taxed in the United States on the receipt of the interest
4 Guidelines for the Formulation of the Provisions of a Bilateral Tax Treaty Between a
Developing Country and a Developed Country, in Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94 (1979) [herein-
after cited as U.N. Guidelines. An earlier incomplete version of the Guidelines is also available.
See Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Guidelines].
5 See INCOME TAX TREATIES 1-2 U. Bischel ed. 1978).
6 J. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 42 (1977).
7 Id
8 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 1, para. 3, 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 153 (May 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Model].
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payment because of the citizenship of the lender; it might be taxed in
Canada because of the residence of the lender; Guatemala might also
assert source jurisdiction upon the payment of that interest. Similar situ-
ations present this issue of double taxation and tax treaties seek to resolve
the problem.
Generally, a country will assert source jurisdiction over items of in-
come which arise within the country. Such source jurisdiction is gener-
ally of either of two types when asserted upon a non-resident's income.
In one situation, the non-resident individual or entity is present in the
tax jurisdiction in a significant and meaningful way-the non-resident
may be engaged in business activity in the jurisdiction or performing
personal services there. This type of source jurisdiction is a form of in
personam jurisdiction which is asserted because of participation in the
source country's economy. The assertion of jurisdiction reflects a cost-
benefit principle and seems to be a fundamentally fair application of the
power of taxation.
In the second situation, the non-resident taxpayer has none of the
personal connections with the taxing country as he does above, but still
receives a specific item of income through the economy of the source
country. The most common items of income in such a case would be
royalties, interest or dividends. The source country would then assert in
rem jurisdiction over the items of income and impose a tax regardless of
the residency status of the recipient. This assertion of jurisdiction is more
difficult to justify because there is not a clear-cut cost-benefit relation-
ship: Rather, the justification of taxation seems to be that the distribut-
ing entity, the borrower of money, the corporation, or the licensee, were
beneficiaries of government services and the income derived through
them should thus be taxed. The economy of a country which is the bene-
ficiary of a loan or corporate investment, however, will generally benefit
from the loan or the investment, and for that reason the justification for
such in rem taxation is weakened. 9 This reasoning is significant in tax
treaty negotiating, particularly among developed countries. Many cur-
rent treaties exempt interest and royalties from source country tax and
dividends are taxed at a reduced withholding rate.10
In addition to source country jurisdiction, most countries assert
domiciliary jurisdiction, which taxes an individual or entity on its resi-
dency. Thus, a country will impose an income tax on residents, individu-
als who bear a relationship to the taxing country. Although different
countries define residence in different ways, it is generally construed to
include a person living in the country on a more or less permanent basis.
The application of the cost-benefit principle of taxation is clear in the
9 See INCOME TAX TREATIES, supra note 5, at 39 for a discussion of general treaty provi-
sions concerning investment income.
1o See izn/a discussion accompanying notes 51-72.
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case of residents: residents consume government services and should be
taxed in order to bear the costs of these services.
Finally, a few countries, particularly the United States, tax the
worldwide income of citizens." Tax jurisdiction based on citizenship
generally is justified by a cost-benefit analysis-a citizen of a country
receives the protection of that country regardless of where the citizen
resides and should therefore help defray the costs of such protection.
In the case of multinational corporations, it is very difficult to
pinpoint a particular country as being the residence or home of the cor-
poration.' 2 The application of the cost-benefit analysis fails since such
corporations typically consume services in a great number of places.
Thus, in determining the residence or citizenship of a multinational cor-
poration, a variety of tests are used. For example, the United Kingdom
considers a corporation a resident if it is "managed and controlled" in
the United Kingdom.13 The United States, however, considers a corpo-
ration to be domestic only if it is created or organized in the United
States.1 4 Thus, a corporation incorporated in the United States and
managed in the United Kingdom will be deemed a resident of both juris-
dictions. A corporation incorporated in the United Kingdom and man-
aged and controlled in the United States will be a non-resident of both
states.
As noted earlier, the dual nature of source jurisdiction may cause
income to be taxed by two or more different jurisdictions. One country
may tax the income of an enterprise because it was earned by a resident
and another country may tax the very same income because its source
was within the taxing country's economy. It is also clear, as illustrated
above by the United States/United Kingdom corporation, that two
countries may claim domiciliary jurisdiction over the same entity. Simi-
larly, because of differences between internal taxing laws, two countries
may also claim to be the source of a particular item of income.
Through their internal laws, some c6untries have begun to deal uni-
laterally with the problem of double taxation. A variety of methods have
been adopted. First, primarily through the codification of international
custom, source jurisdiction is generally accorded priority-the domicili-
ary country does not tax income which has already been taxed at the
source. The domiciliary country exempts such income from tax in one of
two ways: it may exempt from tax any income which has been subject to
a foreign tax or it may reduce its tax on income derived from abroad by
the amount of tax imposed by the source country. The former system is
generally labelled an "exemption system" and the latter is known as a
"foreign tax credit system." The exemption system is losing popularity,
I I I.R.C. § 61 (1976).
12 See J. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, supra note 6, at 1-2.
13 See INCOME TAX TREATIES, supra note 5, at 264, 265 n.185.
14 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (1976).
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despite the fact that a credit system is usually accompanied by a fair
amount of regulatory detail.' 5 It has been generally a matter of accident
and historical antecedent which direction a country took. Only recently
has a systematic analysis of both economics and equity altered the ap-
proach in many countries. 16
As in the case of many national laws which operate in an interna-
tional context, both the exemption system laws and the foreign tax credit
system laws were found to be inadequate solutions to a complex problem,
and double taxation continued to be a problem. In cases where a contin-
ued conflict was present between the laws of two nations, tax treaties
were negotiated.
In addition to resolving problems of double taxation, tax treaties
cover a broad range of topics of interest to a taxing jurisdiction. First,
and perhaps foremost, they define terms which are used in the operative
provisions of the treaty. Most treaties also include statements which as-
sure nondiscriminatory treatment between residents of the two jurisdic-
tions. Furthermore, recent treaties have also begun to include
procedures for consultation between the taxing authorities of the two
countries and also procedures for the exchange of tax information. Such
procedures are adopted to promote more efficient and effective enforce-
ment of the tax laws.17
In the early part of the twentieth century, countries in the League of
Nations began to believe that a uniform system of tax treaties would aid
economic development. To that end, the League of Nations studied a
multitude of income tax treaty provisions and developed several model
drafts of tax treaties.' 8 Two major tax treaty models grew out of the
work of the League of Nations-the Mexico Model of 1943 (Mexico
draft) and the London Model of 1946 (London draft). 19 The Mexico
draft was drawn up during World War II and was basically the work of
authors from the Western Hemisphere. As such it represented the views
of the less-developed nations toward controversial tax issues, particularly
in regard to source jurisdiction. 20 The later London draft reflected the
15 See Surrey, United Nations Group ofExperts and the Guidelines for Tax Treatis Between Devel-
oped and DevelopingCountrtes, 19 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 4 (1978). See also I.R.C. §§ 901-908 (West &
West Supp. 1982) and accompanying regulations at Treas. Reg. §§ 1-901 to -905 (1982) (as
amended). Many practitioners consider these sections, the operative provisions of the U.S. for-
eign tax credit, to be among the most complex of the Internal Revenue Code.
16 Surrey, supra note 15.
17 Liebman, A Formula for Tax-Sparing Credits in US Tax Treaties with Developing Countries,
72 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 302 (1978).
18 Ste supra note 1.
19 League of Nations Doc. C.88M.88 1946.IIA, London and Mexico Model Tax Conven-
tions, Commentary and Text.
20 The viewpoint of many developing countries has been summarized as follows:
The overwhelming majority [of the Latin American countries] were in favor
of taxing income derived from non-residents exclusively at the source in their
territories. They preferred the concept . . . of taxing income from any industrial,
commercial or agricultural business and from any other gainful activity only in
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views of the developed nations. 2' However, as noted above, the two doc-
uments, with their respective commentaries, were published side by side
and were the principal guides for tax treaties until the OECD Model 22
was published in 1963.
The OECD Model was developed in response to the needs of the
developed nations to have a firm and solid treaty base to use in negotia-
tions.2 3 Thus, over the past two decades, the OECD Model and its 1977
revision 24 has served as a point of negotiation for member nations. Al-
though a number of countries associated with the OECD have entered
formal reservations, it would be nearly impossible for a participating
state to negotiate a treaty substantially different from the OECD Model.
Even the United States Treasury in its published model treaty (U.S.
Model) 25 has been substantially influenced by the OECD Model. 26 De-
spite the years of work required to develop the OECD draft, however, at
least one author has noted its similarity to the 1946 London League of
Nations Model. 2 7
In recent years, apparently in response to the preferential bias of the
OECD draft toward negotiations between developed nations, the devel-
oping nations have sought to promulgate their own model treaty.
Through the guidance of the United Nations, an ad hoc group of tax
experts met and developed a different set of guidelines for the negotiation
of treaties between developed and developing nations.28 In promulgat-
ing its own pattern of treaty terms, the United Nations group utilized the
OECD Model as a reference only. 29
the state where the business or activity is carried out, rather than the traditional
principle of where the taxpayer has a permanent establishment.
They contended that the European definition of a permanent establishment
was too restrictive and they wanted to reach any activity that gave rise to income.
Carroll, International Tax Law. Benefits for Amertian Investors and Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT'L LAW.
692, 708 (1968).
21 Id
22 1963 OECD Draft, supra note 2.
23 At the time of publication of the original OECD Model in 1963, the following countries
were OECD members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 1963 OECD
Draft, supra note 2, at 4.
24 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3.
25 U.S. Model, supra note 8.
26 See INCOME TAX TREATIES, supra note 5, at 5, 59.
27 Carroll, supra note 20, at 720.
28 U.N. Guidelines, supra note 4.
29 Professor Surrey has summarized the basic orientation of the U.N. group:
When the Group commenced its work, it had before it the /963 /OECD]
Draft Convention. This model was being used by the developed countries as the
framework for their negotiations . . . . The developed countries, largely through
habit, were also using this OECD model in the negotiations that were commenc-
ing in the 1960's with developing countries. However, the developing countries,
coming new to these negotiations and without having participated in the formu-
lation of the OECD draft, were rather suspicious of it as a basic guide. Moreover,
a number of these countries had a different ideological approach to international
tax issues. These attitudes were the impetus for the formation of the U.N. Group
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III. The OECD Model and the U.N. Guidelines
This section of the article will examine in detail the major provisions
of the 1977 OECD Model Tax Treaty and the United Nations Model
Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing
Countries (U.N. Model). 30 Reference will also be made to the U.S.
Model. For historical perspective, provisions from the League of Nations
model treaties, both the 1943 Mexico draft and the 1946 London draft,
will be examined as well.
Before starting an article by article examination of the 1977 OECD
Model and the U.N. Model, it is important to understand the basic ap-
proach of each of the two groups in greater detail. A general examina-
tion of the OECD Model shows that two themes provide the essential
bases for the provisions of the treaty. First, the country where the indi-
vidual or entity is resident will bear the burden of eliminating double
taxation by instituting either a foreign tax credit or by merely exempting
foreign source income from taxation altogether. Second, the source
country will considerably limit both the extent of its jurisdiction to tax
income as it arises at the source and also the rate of tax which is ulti-
mately imposed where jurisdiction is retained. 31 It must also be realized
in examining the OECD Model that it was drafted exclusively by devel-
oped countries, primarily European and North American, for use among
themselves. 32 Thus, in most instances, no thought was given to the
problems faced by countries which are essentially capital importers and,
as such, source income exporters.
Contrary to the presumptions and assumptions which governed the
OECD Model negotiations, the U.N. Guidelines, on which the U.N.
Model Treaty is based, were developed specifically with an orientation
toward developing nations. Their very title, Guideinesfor the Formulation of
the Provisions of a Bilateral Tax Treaty Between a Developing Country and a
Developed Country, indicated the precise purpose and stance which
predominated during the formulation of the U.N. Guidelines. In gen-
eral, the developing nations have echoed one of the major suppositions of
as a focal point for frank exploration of the differing attitudes. The U.N. Group
decided the most expeditious way to proceed was to use the 1963 Draft Conventon
as a reference for orderly discussion. There was, however, to be no presumption
of correctness for the policy positions adopted in that model or for its language
and commentaries. The Group also decided that, in addition to its recommenda-
tions for guidelines, there should also be developed a full description of the issues
that underlay those guidelines, so that countries in considering the guidelines
could fully appreciate the issues, factors, and nuances of tax treaty negotiations.
The reports therefore contain, in addition to the guidelines recommended, full
coverage of the background discussion and summaries of the issues involved in
and the bases for the conclusions reached by the Group. As a consequence, the
reports offer very considerable guidance to countries desirous of negotiating tax
treaties.
Surrey, supra note 15, at 6-7.
30 U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the U.N. Model].
31 Id. at 8.
32 See jupra note 23.
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the OECD Model: they believe that the country of residence should in
fact work to eliminate double taxation either through a foreign tax credit
or by exemption. 33 The general stance of the developing countries, how-
ever, was to oppose the yielding of source jurisdiction recommended by
the OECD Model. It seems somewhat ironic to note that the first major
proposition of the OECD is a basic yielding of jurisdiction to source,
while the second proposition merely modifies this stance. In effect, the
developing countries seek an almost total yielding to source jurisdiction
by the country with residence jurisdiction. In the U.N. Guidelines nego-
tiations, then, the important question was really the scope which was to
be given to source jurisdiction and what modifications were appropriate.
Professor Surrey aptly described the quest that followed:
This focus [on source jurisdiction] compelled, in turn, a full exploration
of the factors involved in the appropriate exercise of source jurisdiction.
Thus, credit or exemption for foreign source income is seen as a responsi-
bility in international taxation to be accepted by the country of resi-
dence. The question then becomes: what, in turn, are the responsibilities
in international taxation to be accepted by a country of source, espe-
cially when that country is accorded primary jurisdiction?34
The United Nations group wrestled with the problem created by
these two opposing views on source jurisdiction. In the final analysis, a
compromise viewpoint was reached that in many ways reflected the ma-
jority of the goals of each side of the discussion. Thus, the primacy of
source jurisdiction was conceded by all, but it did not remain the exclu-
sive criterion of tax jurisdiction. 35
A. Coverage of the Treaty
The first important item of any law, including tax treaties, is cover-
age. The language of both the U.N. Model and the OECD Model, con-
tained in article I, is identical. Both state, "[tihis Convention shall apply
to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States."
36
Thus, taxation is based on the place of residence of an individual. This
concept has gone through several evolutionary stages as evidenced by the
commentary to the OECD Model and the language of the Mexico and
London drafts. The OECD commentary on article I indicates that "
[w]hereas older Conventions in general were applicable to 'citizens' of
the Contracting States, recent Conventions usually apply to 'residents' of
one or both of the Contracting States, without distinction of national-
ity."' 37 The earlier League of Nations drafts were much broader in their
applicability than the OECD Model, covering "taxpayers of the Con-
33 1974 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 7 para. 30; U.N. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 91-92.
34 Surrey, supra note 15, at 9.
35 1974 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 7 para. 28.
36 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 1; 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 1.
37 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Double Taxation of In-
come and Capital, 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OECD Commentary].
MODEL TAX TREATIES EXAMINED
tracting States, whether nationals or not . .,,3' The OECD Model
recognizes this historical precedent:
Some Conventions are of even wider scope [than the OECD Model] in-
asmuch as they apply more generally to 'taxpayers' of the Contracting
States; they are, therefore, also applicable to persons, who, although not
residing in either State, are nevertheless liable to tax on part of their
income or capital in each of them. The Convention is intended to be
applied between Member countries of the OECD and it has been
deemed preferable for practical reasons to provide that the Convention
is to apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting
States.3
9
The OECD Commentary, article I, para. 11, notes an important
conceptual difference in taxation between OECD member countries.
This paragraph, a reservation, states, "The United States reserves the
right to tax its citizens and residents (with certain exceptions) without
regard to the Convention." 4 This reservation underscores an important
policy difference between the United States and most members of the
international community. The United States has unilaterally, and with-
out exception, refused to yield the right to tax the income of its citizens.
This stance is reflected in the U.S. Model, which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision of this Convention except paragraph 4 of
this Article, a Contracting State may tax its residents. . . and by reason
of citizenship may tax its citizens, as if this Convention had not come
into effect. For this purpose the term 'citizen' shall include a former
citizen whose loss of citizenship had as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of income tax, but only for a period of 10 years following such
loss.
4 1
One of the basic policy reasons for the above reservation is the impor-
tance accorded citizenship by the United States. Economic factors, how-
ever, also seem to predominate. Retaining tax jurisdiction over citizens
discourages a wealthy U.S. citizen from establishing his permanent resi-
dence in a low tax rate country and thus obtaining substantial income
tax relief because of a tax treaty provision. Also, concern for "flight" of
the dollar and the preponderance of tax haven countries mitigates to-
ward retaining tax jurisdiction over citizens. 4 2
Articles 2 and 3 of the U.N. Model and the OECD Model are iden-
tical. Both articles are definitional. Article 2 defines those taxes that are
38 See League of Nations Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions
Commentary and Text Annex, Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double
Taxation of Income, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88.1946.II.A. (1946); League of Nations
Fiscal Committee, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions Commentary and Text Annex,
Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income (Mexico
Draft) art. I, League of Nations Doc. C.88.M.88.1946.II.A. (1946) [hereinafter cited as Mexico
Draft]; id., Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income
and Property (London Draft) art. I [hereinafter cited as London Draft].
39 OECD Commentary, supra note 37, at art. I para. 1.
40Id para. 11.
41 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. I para. 3.
42 Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treattis: The O.E. CD. Drafi, 52 CAL. L. REv. 306, 310-11
(1964).
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covered by the treaty. Article 3 defines certain terms of art, including
"person," "company," "enterprise," and "international traffic."'4 3
Since article 1 of each treaty places a significant emphasis on the
term "resident," its definition has been accorded an entire article in both
treaties. Article 4 of the OECD Model provides as follows:
Fiscal Domicile
1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term "resident of a
Contracting State" means any person who, under the laws of that State,
is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of man-
agement or any other criterion of a similar nature ....
2. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 an individual
is a resident of both Contracting States, then his status shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the following rules:
(a) He shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting
State in which he has a permanent home available to him. If he has a
permanent home available to him in both Contracting States, he shall
be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State with which his per-
sonal and economic relations are closest (centre of vital interests);
(b) If the Contracting State in which he has his centre of vital
interests cannot be determined, or if he has not a permanent home avail-
able to him in either Contracting State, he shall be deemed to be a resi-
dent of the Contracting State in which he has an habitual abode;
(c) If he has an habitual abode in both Contracting States or
in neither of them, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the Con-
tracting State of which he is a national;
(d) If he is a national of both Contracting States or of neither
of them, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall settle
the question by mutual agreement.
3. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person
other than an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it
shall be deemed to be a resident of the Contracting State in which its
place of effective management is situated."
The only significant difference between article 4 of the OECD
Model and article 4 of the U.N. Model is that the second sentence of the
first paragraph of the OECD Model is omitted in the U.N. Model.45
This sentence provides that the term resident does not include "any per-
son who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from
sources in that State of capital situated therein."'4 6 In a country which
asserts only source jurisdiction, this language would characterize certain
residents, particularly diplomats, as non-residents. Such a characteriza-
tion would then deprive these residents of the benefits of the treaty. In-
sertion of the sentence would be appropriate if both countries tax
residents on a world-wide basis.
The United States has entered a reservation to the OECD Model
that is reflected in the U.S. Model. A company which is a resident of
43 U.N. Model, supra note 30, arts. 2, 3; 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, arts. 2, 3.
44 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 4.
45 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 4.
46 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 4.
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both Contracting States is treated as a resident of the state in which it is
organized. 47 This employs a mechanical objective test of 'residency
which seems superior to the subjective test employed by the OECD. One
potential drawback of this test, however, is that a company can be a
resident of both states under paragraph 1 of article 4 of the U.S. Model,
but because of incorporation in a non-contracting state, not a resident of
either under paragraph 3. This problem is more effectively dealt with
under the OECD language.
The final definitional articles of the OECD and U.N. Models deal
with the definition of a "permanent establishment. ' '48 The major differ-
ence between the two treaties involves the range of activities encom-
passed in' the term "permanent establishment. ' 49  The concept of a
permanent establishment is essentially jurisdiction limiting, and any ex-
cluded activity remains untaxed in the host country. The U.N. drafters,
at the impetus of the developing countries, sought to expand the scope of
activities encompassed in the definition. The group expanded the limits
of source jurisdiction to the extent that some activities that were ex-
cluded by the OECD definition were included in the U.N. Model.
B. Treatment of Immovable Property
The taxation of income from immovable property is dealt with in a
traditional manner. In both the OECD Model and the U.N. Models,
article 6 states that income from immovable property is taxable in the
state where the property is located. The U.S. Model is in accord. 50 Both
the Mexico and London drafts also take this stance, and perhaps phrase
the matter most succinctly in article II: "Income from real property shall
be taxable only in the State in which the property is situated. '51 This
uniformity of position is probably the result of a consistent view of in rem
taxing jurisdiction by the developed countries, and a preference for
source jurisdiction by the developing countries. Textually, neither the
OECD Model nor the U.N. Model indicates whether tax should be im-
posed on gross or net income, but the U.N. Guidelines note that "the
taxation of income. . . should have as its appropriate objective the taxa-
tion of profits rather than gross income."'5 2 This appears to be a conces-
sion to developed countries which believe that expenses should be offset
in taxing such income.
47 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 4 para. 3.
48 See generally Income Tax Treaties, supra note 5, at 208-245.
49 E.g., a building site is considered a permanent establishment under the OECD Model if
it lasts more than 12 months. 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 5 para. 3. The U.N. Model
shortens this period to 6 months. U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 5 para. 3.
50 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 6.
5t Mexico and London Drafts, supra note 38, art. II. These articles literally apply to real
property only, in contrast to the broader category of "immovable" property.
52 U.N. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 53.
50 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
C. Taxation of Dividends
The taxation of dividends generated by a corporation in one coun-
try and paid to a citizen of another country has been a consistent concern
of tax treaties. The Mexico draft is quite straightforward in its source
jurisdiction over dividends: "income from movable capital shall be taxa-
ble only in the Contracting State where such capital is invested. '" 3 In
contrast, the London draft taxes dividends only at the fiscal domicile of
the company that is paying the dividends. 54 An exception is made, how-
ever, when the company in one Contracting State has a "dominant par-
ticipation in the management of capital of the company paying
dividends." In that case the dividends are exempt from tax in the state
of source. 55 The OECD model takes a slightly different approach to the
problem of dividend taxation. It proposes taxation by the country when
the company is a twenty-five or greater percent subsidiary of the com-
pany paying dividends; in all other cases, a fifteen percent limit on with-
holding tax is utilized. 56 The U.S. Model approach to the taxation of
dividends is identical to that of the OECD Model, except that the five
percent rule becomes applicable if the parent owns only ten percent of
the subsidiary paying dividends.5 7
The U.N. Model adopts a compromise view of the above drafts. Ar-
ticle 10, which directs the taxation of dividends, allows both the country
of source and the country of residence to tax dividends from investments
in the source country.58 The major differences between the OECD
Model and the U.N. Model relate to the withholding rate and the per-
centage of ownership which is considered direct investment. The U.N.
Model, rather than fixing uniform rates for all parties, leaves the rate
open to negotiation between the two states. 59 The Guidelines state that
this allows the two Contracting States to "work out through negotiation
the appropriate level of withholding rates on dividends. . . that [i]s con-
ducive to the movement of investment capital desired, considering the
basic corporate taxes in the two countries and the double-taxation relief
offered by the negotiating residence countries." 6 This stance was accept-
able to the developing countries since it tends to aid the investor of capi-
tal and does not add revenue to the government of the residence country.
D. Treatment of Interest
The various models treat interest in a manner similar to dividends.
The Mexico draft language of article IX, which provides that "[i]ncome
53 Mexico Draft, supra note 38, art. IX.
54 London Draft, supra note 38, art. VIII para. 1.
55 Id para. 2.
56 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 10 paras. 1, 2.
57 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 10 paras. I, 2.
58 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 10 paras. 1, 2.
59 Id para. 2.
60 1974 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 41.
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from movable capital shall be taxable only in the Contracting State
where such capital is invested," is, of course, applicable to interest pay-
ments as well as to dividends. Thus, the treatment under the Mexico
draft is wholly a source-based test. The London draft, in article IX, takes
a contrary view on the taxation of interest:
1. Interest on bonds, securities, notes, debentures or'on any other
form of indebtedness shall be taxable only in the State where the credi-
tor has his fiscal domicile.
2. The State of the debtor is, however, entitled to tax such interest
by means of deduction or withholding at source.6 1
The OECD Model has further developed the theme enunciated in
the London draft. Following the lead of the London draft, the OECD
Model allows interest to be taxed in the state where the recipient is resi-
dent. Additionally, as in the London draft, the source country may tax
the interest through withholding, but it must limit the rate to ten per-
cent. 62 However, if the beneficial owner of the interest carries on busi-
ness in the other state through a permanent establishment, and the debt
on which the interest is being paid is effectively connected with this per-
manent establishment, the rules regarding interest are not applied, and
the business profits or personal services rules apply.6 3 Furthermore, if a
special relationship exists between the payer and the beneficial owner of
the interest, and the interest payments are excessive, the excessive
amount will not be taxed under the interest provisions of the treaty.
64
This last qualification reflects a theory of allocation of income similar to
section 482 of the United States Internal Revenue Code.65 The U.S.
Model is quite similar to the OECD Model, except that it contemplates
exclusive jurisdiction by the residence jurisdiction and does not provide a
withholding rate.66 The other provisions are essentially identical to those
of the OECD.
In taxing interest, the U.N. draft follows the same guidelines that
are present in the taxation of dividends. Both the source jurisdiction and
the residence jurisdiction may tax the interest payments. The rate of
withholding is left open for negotiation between the two Contracting
States.
67
61 London Draft, supra note 38, art. IX.
62 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. II paras. 1, 2.
63 Id. art. 4.
64 Id. art. 6.
65 I.R.C. § 482 (1976) (giving Secretary of Treasury power to allocate income, deductions,
credits, or allowances in order to prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect actual income).
66 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 10.
67 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. II paras. 1, 2. The U.N. Group of Experts wrote the
following guidelines to be used in negotiating the withholding rate:
(a) In the absence of treaties, both the country of source and the country of
the lender may tax the interest, subject to whatever unilateral double-taxation
relief is granted by the country of the lender. In bilateral negotiations, there nor-
mally will be consideration of those two claims to taxation and the negotiations
may accommodate those claims to the extent agreed upon;
(b) The country of source, if establishing a withholding tax on gross interest
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The U.N. Group of Experts used similar schemes of net interest pay-
ments and net dividend payments in the respective articles on interest
and dividends. This reflects the process of negotiation that was an im-
portant part of formulating the U.N. Guidelines. It is probable that the
developed nations started from the unilateral position of the London
draft that dividends should be taxable only in the residence jurisdiction.
Likewise, the language of the Mexico draft, favoring exclusive source ju-
risdiction, was urged by the developing nations. The developed nations'
position was weakened by the language of the OECD Model. The final
position of the U.N. draft, negotiating interest rates and allowing both
countries taxing jurisdiction, is a viable compromise. Negotiating to de-
termine net interest rather than gross interest allows for variations in the
costs of doing business in various States.
E. Treatment of Royaltzes
The conflict between source jurisdiction and residence jurisdiction is
also evident in the treatment of royalties. The Mexico draft adopts a
strict source jurisdiction taxing mechanism:
1. Royalties from immovable property or in respect of the opera-
tion of a mine, a quarry, or other natural resource shall be taxable only
in the Contracting State in which such property, mine, quarry, or other
natural resource is located.
2. Royalties and amounts received as a consideration for the right
to use a patent, a secret process or formula, a trademark or other analo-
gous right shall be taxable only in the State where such right is
exploited. 6 8
The London draft adopts source jurisdiction for royalties paid for
the exploitation of natural resources, but adopts a strict residence juris-
dictional stance concerning royalties for intangibles:
2. Royalties derived from one of the Contracting States by an in-
dividual, corporation or other entity of the other Contracting State in
consideration for the right to use a patent, a secret process or formula, a
trademark or other analagous right, shall not be taxable in the former
State.
in a tax treaty, would, from the standpoint of the effect of expenses, presumably
seek a rate that approximated the result which would apply, either over-all or by
loan categories, under taxation at regular rates, but on net interest;
(c) From the approach indicated in paragraph (b), if an expense ratio were
agreed upon in fixing the gross rate, it would appear to follow that the country of
the lender, if following a credit method, would apply that expense ratio as the
basis for determining its credit, whenever feasible. Therefore, the matter should
be considered under article 23;
(d) Where this general approach to the taxation of interest resulted in a
source tax higher than the credit allowed in the country of the lender because of a
difference in tax rates, the source country would, in bilateral negotiations or
otherwise, take that situation into account in establishing the final rate;
(e) Nothing in the foregoing would oblige the country of the lender to allow
a credit equal to the regular rate of net income of the source country; the credit
would be fixed in bilateral negotiations.
1974 Guidelines, supra note 4, at 45-46.
68 Mexico Draft, supra note 38, art. X.
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4. Royalties derived from one of the Contracting States by an in-
dividual, corporation or other entity of the other Contracting State, in
consideration for the right to use an artistic, scientific or other cultural
work or publication shall not be taxable in the former State.
6 9
Treatment of royalties under the OECD Model is identical to that
of the London draft: "Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid
to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that
other State."' 70 This exclusive residence jurisdiction is waived if the
property or right which gave rise to the royalty payment is effectively
connected with a permanent establishment in the country of the licen-
see.
7 1 The OECD Model also includes know-how sales as a right which
is taxed under the royalty provisions.7 2 The final paragraph provides for
arm's length dealing in the case of royalties, and declares that tainted
transactions will be reallocated.
73
Royalties are treated under article 12 of the U.N. Model:
1. Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident
of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.
2. However, such royalties may also be taxed by the Contracting
State in which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if
the recipient is the beneficial owner of the royalties, the tax so charged
shall not exceed . . . percent (the percentage is to be established through
bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of the royalties. The compe-
tent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement set-
tle the mode of application of this limitation.
3. The term "royalties" as used in this Article means payments of
any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use,
any copyright of literary, artistic, or scientific work including
cinematograph films . .. , any patent, trademark, design or model,
plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or the right to use,
industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment, or for information con-
cerning industrial, commercial, or scientific experience.
7 4
In the same manner that the U.N. group reached a compromise on
interests and dividends, it also reached a compromise on the subject of
taxation of royalties. The article on royalties allows both the source and
the residence country to tax royalties and, again, the rates are to be de-
termined by negotiation rather than by having a fixed rate imposed.
F Capital Gains Treatment
Capital gains are another source of income dealt with under the
treaties. The OECD Model addresses capital gains in article 13:
1. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the
69 London Draft, supra note 38, art. X.
70 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 12 para. 1.
71 Id para. 3.
72 Id. para. 2.
73 Id para. 4.
74 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 12.
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alienation of immovable property referred to in Article 6 and situated in
the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.
2. Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of
the business property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise
of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State or a movable
property pertaining to a fixed base available to a resident of a Con-
tracting State in the other Contracting State for the purpose of perform-
ing independent personal services, including such gains from the
alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the whole
enterprise) or of such fixed base, may be taxed in that other State.
3. Gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in inter-
national traffic, boats engaged in inland waterways transport or mova-
ble property pertaining to the operation of such ships, aircraft or boats,
shall be taxable only in the Contracting State in which the place of effec-
tive management of the enterprise is situated.
4. Gains from the alienation of any property other than that re-
ferred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, shall be taxable only in the Con-
tracting State of which the alienator is a resident. 75
This language, almost by omission, exempts gains of a non-resident de-
rived from the sale of property, unless the gains are realized on the sale of
real property or in connection with the sale of the business property of a
permanent establishment. The U.S. Model takes an almost identical
approach. 76
The U.N. Model is similar to the OECD Model except that the par-
agraph 4 catch-all exemption of unenumerated property was modified.
Article 13, paragraph 4 provides that "[glains from the alienation of
shares of the capital stock of a company the property of which consists
directly or indirectly principally of immovable property situated in a
Contracting State may be taxed by that State." Paragraph 5 provides
another basis for source jurisdiction: "Gains from the alienation of
shares other than those mentioned in paragraph 4 representing a partici-
pation of. . . per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilat-
eral negotiation) in a company which is a resident of a State may be
taxed in that State." These two modifications were added at the insis-
tence of various groups. Developed counties were unhappy with the to-
tal exemption of sales of stock in the case where the basic asset of the
corporation was real property located in the state; to avoid Article 6 tax-
ation of immovable property under the OECD Model, nonresident aliens
needed merely to place the real property in a corporate entity. The sec-
ond additional basis ofjurisdiction reflects similar concerns. It imposes a
tax on the sale of a given percentage of participation in a company by
the country where the company is resident, such percentage to be deter-
mined by bilateral negotiation. 77
75 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 13.
76 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 22.
77 Surrey, supra note 15, at 42.
MODEL TAX TREATIES EXAMINED
G Taxation of Personal Services
The taxation of personal services has been a constant issue in inter-
national tax. Both the Mexico and London drafts contain substantially
identical provisions for the taxation of personal services. The League of
Nations drafts tax income from personal services in the State where the
services are rendered. An exemption is granted, however, when the em-
ployee who is a resident of the one country works in the other country for
less than 183 days. If he is in the other country for more than 183 days,
he is taxable only in that country and his liability to the former country
ceases. A professional is taxable only in the state where he has a perma-
nent establishment. If the professional has a permanent establishment in
each state, he is, taxable in each state only on the income for services
rendered there. 78
The OECD Model divides services into two types: independent and
dependent.
Independent Personal Services
1. Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect
of professional services or other activities of an independent character
shall be taxable only in that State unless he has a fixed base regularly
available to him in the other Contracting State for the purpose of per-
forming his activities. If he has such a fixed base, the income may be
taxed in the other State but only so much of it as is attributable to that
fixed base.
2. The term "professional services" includes especially independ-
ent scientific, literary, artistic, educational or teaching activities as well




1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 16, 18 and 19, salaries,
wages and other similar remuneration derived by a resident of a Con-
tracting State in respect of an employment shall be taxable only in that
State unless the employment is exercised in the other Contracting State.
If the employment is so exercised, such remuneration as is derived there-
from may be taxed in that other State.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, remuneration
derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment
exercised in the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in the first-
mentioned State if:
(a) the recipient is present in the other State for a period or
periods not exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in the fiscal year con-
cerned, and
(b) the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer
who is not a resident of the other State, and
(c) the remuneration is not borne by a permanent establish-
ment or a fixed base which the employer has in the other State.
3. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, remu-
neration derived in respect of an employment exercised aboard a ship or
aircraft operated in international traffic, or aboard a boat engaged in
78 Mexico Draft, supra note 38, art. VII; London Draft, supra note 36, art. V1.
79 1977 OECD Model, supra note 3, art. 14.
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inland waterways transport, may be taxed in the Contracting State in
which the place of effective management of the enterprise is situated.8 0
The U.N. Model's versions of these two articles are virtually identi-
cal. The U.N. Model allows taxation by the "other Contracting State"
in two additional instances-when independent personal services are
rendered by a resident of a Contracting State: when his stay in the other
Contracting State exceeds 183 days, or if his remuneration for services
exceeds a certain negotiated amount."' Again the U.N. Model and
Guidelines have placed a premium on the value of negotiation; in this
case, if the payment for services exceeds a certain negotiated amount,
then both states can tax a portion of the remuneration.
The U.S. Model is similar to the OECD Model, except that like the
U.N. Guidelines, it also permits taxation in the "other State" if the indi-
vidual is present there for an aggregate amount of time exceeding 183
days. The provisions of article 15 are substantially identical to those of
article 15 of the OECD Model.
IV. U.S. Foreign Policy Considerations
With the completion of the U.N. Guidelines, the United States
Treasury should begin to re-examine its policies in light of those adopted
by the United Nations. In this portion of the article, an examination of
the current United States position on tax expenditures to developing na-
tions will be made, as well as an examination of treaties that reflect the
current positions of several other developed nations that have extensive
dealings with developing nations. Finally, policy reformulations that
might be made by the Treasury that would not be inconsistent with its
current positions will be considered.
At this point, the United States offers no special tax incentives for
United States residents to invest in developing countries, nor does it offer
any special tax-sparing for, or tax-sharing with, developing countries.
Prior to 1976 certain benefits did exist for investment in "less developed
countries." The provisions, which were repealed, included a favorable
computation of the foreign tax credit with respect to dividends that were
received from corporations in less developed countries. The formula
computation allowed the U.S. corporate taxpayer a deduction for all of
the foreign tax that was paid as well as a credit for a percentage of that
tax.
8 2
A second provision that was eliminated was a portion of the capital
gains tax under section 1248 of the Internal Revenue Code. Prior to
1976, the Code exempted from taxation earnings and profits accumu-
8 0 Id. art. 15.
81 U.N. Model, supra note 30, art. 14; U.N. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 81.
82 I.R.C. § 902(b) (1963) (amended 1976). The Senate Report on the Tax Reform Act of
1976 reflects an interest in uniform treatment of U.S. corporate taxpayers. S. Rep. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1976). The amendment of § 902(b) was predicted to result in an
estimated increase of $64 million in budget receipts in fiscal year 1977 alone. d. at 243.
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lated by a foreign corporation while it was incorporated in a less devel-
oped country, as long as the stock had been held for more than ten
years.8 3 Under section 954, foreign base company income did not consist
of dividends and interest received from, or gains realized from, the sale of
qualified investments in less developed countries if the amount of the
gain was offset by other investments in developing countries. This defer-
ral provision was repealed in 1975.84 Other, less important provisions
that benefited investors in developing countries were also repealed. At
this point, the United States offers no special tax incentives for investing
in developing countries.
The only current U.S. concession to foreign investment is deferral of
taxation until either dividends are remitted to shareholders or the stock is
sold.85 As long as the corporation continues to invest its profits in foreign
operations and does not remit them to shareholders, no U.S. tax is im-
posed. Deferral does not inure solely to the benefit of developing coun-
tries, however. As a policy incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code,
deferral is available for any foreign investment. Deferral also allows cor-
porations to take advantage of local tax holidays by not remitting in-
come until the tax holiday is exhausted.
The international tax policy of the United States is one of capital
export neutrality. It is characterized by deferral of foreign base income
until such income is remitted. Export neutrality is defined as neutrality
among firms regardless of location; both foreign and domestic corpora-
tions will pay the same rate of tax.86
Because of its position supporting capital export neutrality, the
United States has not entered into any tax-sparing arrangements with
developing countries. A tax-sparing provision would provide corpora-
tions with a significant tax incentive for investing in a foreign country.
Provisions allowing tax-sparing operate in the following manner:
A tax-sparing credit is a credit granted by a capital-exporting country
for the foreign taxes that would have been paid by its taxpayers earning
income in a developing country were it not for a tax holiday or special
concession accorded as an incentive for economic development. Thus, if
the United States were to accede to the tax-sparing principle, it would
allow a foreign tax credit not only for foreign taxes actually paid but for
certain foreign taxes that have been "spared" by mutually agreed-upon
tax concessions.
The reason for the resort to such credits lies in the workings of the
foreign tax credit mechanism. If credit is only accorded for taxes actu-
ally paid, a tax holiday by a developing country will result in a lower
credit commensurate with the lower taxes paid. The lower credit is di-
83 I.R.C. § 1248(d)(3) (1963) (amended 1976).
84 Id § 954(b)(1) (repealed 1975). The Senate Finance Committee felt that investment in
less developed countries should be encouraged in a more direct manner. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 228-29 (1976).
85 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1248 (1976).
86 Anthoine, Tax Systems of Major Capital Exporting Countries: An Examination of Incentive for
Private Investment at Home and in Developing Countries, 32 TAx L. REv. 323, 349 (1977).
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rectly tied to the payment of higher taxes to the U.S. Treasury. Thus,
the taxpayer-investor receives little or no benefit at all from the tax holi-
day. Rather, the U.S. Treasury receives revenue it would not have
otherwise obtained in the absence of the holiday.
8 7
Other developed countries offer a variety of incentives to encourage
private investment in developing countries. France and Germany,
through their internal laws, exempt remitted profits of subsidiaries lo-
cated in developing countries. a8 Canada also exempts such profits and
willingly encourages investment through treaty arrangements.8 9 Tax-
sparing treaties have been approved by both England and Japan.90 Fi-
nally, France, Germany and Japan offer direct tax incentives for invest-
ment in developing countries.9' A cursory examination of the incentives
other countries offer clearly indicates that the United States has not fol-
lowed the general trend in granting incentives toward investment or in
giving tax aid to developing countries.
Before examining potential changes in U.S. policy, it is important to
realize a shift in general public attitudes toward investment in, and aid
to, developing countries. During the 1960s, when a world-wide economic
boom was in full swing, investment flow and aid to developing countries
were encouraged by the 1962 tax act.92 As increased oil prices plunged
the world into a recession, concern for inflation, unemployment, and
other economic developments at home became more important. Con-
cern for American jobs and a balanced budget caused Congress to repeal
most of the 1962 legislation in the 1976 tax reform act.93 Public concern
for the fate of developing nations seemed muted following the Southeast
Asian crisis, nationalization of American industry in Chile, and manipu-
lation of the oil supply by OPEC. Many countries no longer seemed
even to welcome an influx of American dollars. Thus, the push to legis-
late for tax incentives for investment or tax aid for developing nations
currently lacks popular political support.
With these attitudes in mind, an examination of possible changes
takes on a different focus. Changes in the structure of the Internal Reve-
nue Code that would benefit developing countries would be politically
unfeasible. First, such changes would be viewed as subsidies to large cor-
porations. Second, as outlined above, aid to developing nations is not a
popular political topic; more and more Americans see such aid as
counter-productive, particularly if it involves even a potential loss of
American jobs. Thus, an overall legislative overhaul seems out of the
question. The remaining method of using the tax system for aid to a
developing nation is the tax treaty. The major advantages of a tax treaty
87 Liebman, supra note 17, at 306.
88 Anthoine, supra note 86, at 327.
89 Id at 330.
90 Id at 343-47.
91 Id. at 353.
92 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
93 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
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are obvious-the provisions are negotiated and can be varied from coun-
try to country; negotiation is discretionary so that incentives may be
granted only to countries that have established favorable relationships
with the United States; and treaties may be terminated on six months
notice.94
Under a strict economic analysis, tax-sparing provisions in a treaty
offer the most valuable tax incentives for an American corporation to
invest in a developing country. From a political standpoint, however,
tax-sparing treaties are unpopular. The tax exemption of income earned
in a developing country would alter the relative tax burden of foreign
and domestic taxpayers in an undesirable way; it is inconsistent with for-
eign tax credit policies, which seek to maintain uniformity in the tax
burden imposed on domestic and foreign earned income. Tax-sparing
provisions also inure directly to the benefit of the corporation rather than
to the country itself.95 In addition, the United States Senate has once
refused to ratify a treaty which contained tax-sparing provisions.96
The final alternative for aiding developing countries through a tax
mechanism is found in the terms of the U.N. Guidelines. In its sugges-
tions for negotiating treaties with developing nations, the United Nations
draft relies heavily on two concepts: primacy of source jurisdiction and
the value of negotiating withholding rates. These two concepts, which
are not at all foreign to United States tax policy, offer a valuable foreign
aid device: tax-sharing.
Conceptually, the yielding of source jurisdiction is already a basic
standard in U.S. foreign tax policy. Both the tax credit, which is part of
U.S. internal laws, and the treaties to which the U.S. is party emphasize
the primacy of source jurisdiction. A yielding of source jurisdiction on
the items of interest, dividends and royalties would be a different posture
from that already adopted by the United States, but such tax-sharing is
feasible under our internal laws and policies.
In addition to being consistent with the concept of source jurisdic-
tion, manipulating the withholding rate on dividends, interest, and roy-
alties is consistent with capital export neutrality. The higher rate of
withholding granted under a tax treaty does not benefit the corporation:
rather it benefits the developing nation. The higher withholding tax
yields a larger foreign tax credit to the corporation, which is then applied
against its tax liability. The tax liability remains unchanged but the
Treasury receives fewer tax dollars because of the tax credit.
The most important aspect of a negotiable withholding rate is its
flexibility. The revenue loss to the Treasury, the cost of tax-sharing, can
be estimated for any specific withholding rate; in negotiating a treaty,
94 U.S. Model, supra note 8, art. 24.
95 Surrey, Internaonal Tax Conventions. How They Operate and What They Accomp/ish, 23 J.
TAX'N 366 (1965).
96 Liebman, supra note 17, at 296.
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the OECD rates can be used as a base and the amount of foreign aid to
be granted through tax-sharing can be determined by adjusting upward
from that base. A second advantage to this flexible rate lies in its attrac-
tiveness to the developing country. A country granted a high withhold-
ing rate will seek out American investors, since the more investors with
capital situated there, the higher the taxes shared by the local fisc. The
country itself would then be moving toward greater development with
minimal foreign intrusion into its domestic affairs.
In addition to maintaining consistency with U.S. tax policy, adopt-
ing the U.N. Guidelines provisions on these subjects places U.S. action in
conformity with U.N. recommendations. This may be of immeasurable
psychological advantage in future dealings with the Third World.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the adoption of the U.N. Guide-
lines lies in the adoption of two model tax treaties: the OECD Model
and the U.N. Model. Although this will undoubtedly cause conflicts of
varying degrees, it is important to note, first, that the U.N. Guidelines
were developed from the OECD Model and many of the provisions are
identical. Second, treaties with developed nations serve the single pur-
pose of avoiding double taxation. Treaties with developing countries
seek not only to avoid double taxation, but to aid the economic develop-
ment of the nation.
The U.N. Guidelines provisions for interest, dividends and royalties
outlined in Part III of this article should be adopted by the U.S. in its
negotiations of tax treaties with developing nations. Through tax-shar-
ing, these provisions offer aid to the economic development of the nation
and add money to its internal treasuries. Although the provisions di-
rectly affect the tax revenues collected by the United States, they offer a
form of foreign aid over which the recipient country has direct control.
